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BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA v.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
APPLICATION OF THE PER SE RULE TO PRICE-FIXING
AGREEMENTS
In Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association,' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court ruling that invalidated regulation of college football television
contracts by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). This
decision left colleges and universities free to contract for the sale of
broadcast rights to their football games. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma held that the NCAA television foot-
ball plan and network contracts constituted an illegal price-fixing agree-
ment and thus were per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.2 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that
the NCAA regulations were illegal per se and, under the rule of reason
analysis of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, also found the regulations to be
unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.3
On July 21, 1983, Justice Byron White of the United States Supreme
Court issued a stay blocking the implementation of the Tenth Circuit's
decision pending the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari.4 Jus-
tice White found the per se price-fixing holding to be questionable and
expressed doubt as to whether the correct result was reached under the
rule of reason analysis.5 This comment analyzes the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion under the per se rule and the rule of reason, and suggests the possi-
ble outcome of the Supreme Court decision.
1. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
2. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F.
Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272
(1983). Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act states that "[elvery contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147. In addition to the illegal price-fixing decision, the district court
found that the NCAA regulations constituted an illegal group boycott and monopolized the
intercollegiate football broadcast market. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1282. Although addressing
these issues, the circuit court was primarily concerned with two questions: (1) whether the
NCAA television plan and network contracts constituted price-fixing which was unlawful
per se, and (2) whether the NCAA television plan and network contracts were unlawful
under a rule of reason analysis. 707 F.2d at 1150, 1159 n.16.
4. 104 S. Ct. 1 (White, Circuit Justice 1983). Certiorari was granted on Oct. 17, 1983. 104
S. Ct. 272 (1983).
5. 104 S. Ct. 1 (White, Circuit Justice 1983).
185
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Price Fixing Agreements and the Supreme Court
Taken literally, the broad language of section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act (Sherman Act) prohibits every agreement in restraint of trade
or commerce.6 To distinguish between legal and illegal restraints, the
courts developed two modes of analysis: the per se rule and the rule of
reason.
The rule of reason was first articulated in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States.' Realizing that the language of section 1 of the
Sherman Act could cause even insignificant restraints of trade to be
barred, the Supreme Court construed the act as prohibiting only those
restraints that were "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."8
The rule of reason requires a court to determine whether a restraint
merely regulates competition or restrains it. In making this determina-
tion, the court must analyze the nature, purpose, and character of the
restraint, as well as the surrounding circumstances.9 Because this inquiry
involves an analysis of many aspects, it frequently necessitates substan-
tial costs and elaborate, time-consuming investigation. 0 As an alternative
to the burdensome and sophisticated analysis required under the rule of
reason, the courts developed the per se rule..
The per se rule allows courts, based on past experience with particular
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Sherman Act was initially read by the Supreme Court to
condemn all restraints of trade, not just unreasonable restraints. See, e.g., United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). But see Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (espousing the modern view that Congress only intended to
preclude agreements that unreasonably restrict trade or commerce).
7. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8. Id. at 58.
9. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Writing for the Court,
Justice Brandeis articulated the best known interpretation of the rule of reason:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains . . ..The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
10. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court in Northern
described the rule of reason analysis as "an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Id. at 5.
[Vol. 18:185
19831 Board of Regents v. NCAA
kinds of restraints, to invalidate certain practices as unlawful per se.' 1
The rule applies to those activities that are so adverse to competition that
they are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable restraints on trade.
12
They are "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except [the] stifling
of competition.' 3 Occasionally the result obtained under the per se rule
will differ from the result that would have been obtained under the rule
of reason. However, "[flor the sake of business certainty and litigation
efficiency, [courts] have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements
that a full blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable." 4
Price-fixing is one activity that the Supreme Court has held to be un-
reasonable per se.' 5 The Court first applied the Sherman Act to a price-
fixing agreement in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa-
tion,'6 and declined to inquire into the reasonableness of a rate agreement
among railroads. Instead it found the agreement to be illegal on its face. 17
In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,' 8 the Supreme Court rea-
soned that all price-fixing agreements were illegal per se because they
purposefully eliminated competition.19 The Court noted that it was insig-
11. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972) ("It is only after consid-
erable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.").
12. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). "[There are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." Id.
13. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
14. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) ("As in every
rule of general application, the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect.").
See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). In Container Corp. of
America Justice Marshall explained:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the as-
sumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and
that significant administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential
competitive harm plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular sit-
uations the practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result.
If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are
simply not worth identifying in individual cases.
Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In Socony, the
Court defined price-fixing-
[Pirices are fixed ... if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is
agreed upon, if the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on ascending
or descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if by various formulae they are
related to the market prices. They are fixed because they are agreed upon.
Id. at 222.
16. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
17. Id. at 292.
18. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
19. Id. at 397-98. In Trenton, the Court justified the per se rule application stating.
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nificant that the prices fixed were reasonable, because it was the power to
control the market and fix unreasonable prices in the future that made
such agreements illegal.20 The Court further applied the rule pertaining
to possible restraints in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,21 stat-
ing that price-fixing agreements, whatever their economic justification,
were "banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central
nervous system of the economy. "22
The per se rule has been extended to include agreements that have tra-
ditionally benefited consumers. For example, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Jo-
seph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,23 the Court invalidated a maximum price-
fixing agreement that was intended to put a ceiling on the retail price of
certain liquor products. The Court did not consider the possible economic
benefits of the maximum price agreement, but instead argued that any
agreement to fix prices will "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."2 In
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States," the Court
found illegal on its face a restriction by the professional society against
competitive bidding for engineering services.26 Although the ban on com-
petitive bidding did not literally constitute price-fixing, the Court found
that the restriction unreasonably restrained competition by preventing
price comparisons by consumers27
In the most recent price-fixing case before the Supreme Court, Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Society,2 the Court held that maximum fee
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of
one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or
not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable
prices. The reasonable price fixed today may, through economic and business
changes, become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be
maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agree-
ment for a price reasonable when fixed .... [W]e should hesitate to adopt a con-
struction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of busi-
ness relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable ....
Id. at 397-98.
20. Id. at 398.
21. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
22. Id. at 226 n.59. The Socony Court stated that "[u]nder the Sherman Act [any] combi-
nation formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity ... is illegal per se." Id. at 223. The Court also noted
that no inquiry as to the reasonableness of the plan was necessary because the plan inter-
fered with market forces regardless of whether it raised, lowered, or stabilized prices. Id.
23. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). The Court held that an agreement to fix maximum resale prices
violated the Sherman Act "no less than [an agreement] to fix minimum prices." Id. at 213.
24. Id.
25. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
26. Id. at 693.
27. Id. at 692-93.
28. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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schedules set by medical foundation doctors were unlawful per se.2 ' The
Court found that the maximum fee rates tended "to provide the same
economic rewards to all practitioners" 3 regardless of their skill, experi-
ence, or training. Notably, the Court rejected the defendant's argument
that the per se rule should not apply because the plan had procompetitive
justifications.3 ' Finding this argument to be a "misunderstanding of the
per se concept, '32 the Court stated that "the anticompetitive potential
inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation
even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some. '33
B. The Ancillary Restraint Exception
Naked restraints which have as their sole purpose the elimination of
competition are unlawful. However, some restraints that eliminate com-
petition are ancillary to a "cooperative productive activity" or an "inte-
gration of [legitimate] functions."' These restraints are deemed to be
subordinate to the main justifiable purpose of the activity, and their pur-
pose becomes one of promoting the efficiency of that activity. 5 Thus, one
29. Id. The defendants, in an attempt to provide the surrounding community with a com-
petitive alternative to existing health insurance plans, organized the medical society to pro-
mote fee-for-service medicine. Under such a plan, a policyholder paid one flat fee which
provided coverage for all medical expenses incurred during the term of the policy. The pri-
mary activity of the medical society was to establish the maximum fees that participating
doctors could charge for services rendered to patients insured under the program. Id. at 339.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 351.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898). In
Addyston, Judge Taft first proposed the concept of ancillary restraints as a way of judging
the legality of those restrictions on competition that were socially valuable. One familiar
example of the use of ancillary restraints occurs in the typical law partnership. A law firm
consists of lawyers who have agreed to eliminate competition between themselves and, in-
stead, integrate their activities in the interest of making their resources more effective. The
lawyers agree on the fees to be charged and the division of proceeds. While this looks similar
to price-fixing, the law firm is lawful because of the shared belief that economic cooperation
in production is beneficial to the economy. As Judge Taft explained:
[W]hen two [men become] partners in a business, although their union might reduce
competition, this effect [is] only an incident to the main purpose of a union of their
capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful business, and one useful to the
community. Restriction in the articles of partnerships upon the business activity of
the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise,
[are], of course only ancillary to the main end of their union, and [are] to be
encouraged.
Id. at 283. See also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 26-30 (1978); L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 131 (1977); Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95
HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1527-29 (1982).
35. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). See
also R. BORK, supra note 34, at 279.
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method used to test the enforceability of agreements in restraint of trade
is to determine whether the restraints involved are naked, or whether
those restraints are ancillary to a legitimate activity or function, and
therefore lawful.36
One of the most recent cases applying the ancillary restraint test was
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,37 where the Su-
preme Court stated that not every agreement that "literally" fixes prices
is illegal per se.38 The question before the Court was whether the issuance
of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical compositions at fees negotiated
by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and
Broadcast Music, Inc. constituted per se price-fixing. 9 The test utilized
by the Court was whether the activity was "one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output, or in-
stead. . . 'increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather
than less, competitive.' "40 The Court held that the challenged activity
literally fixed a price, but an established price was found to be a "neces-
sary consequence" of the creation of blanket licenses, which had unique
characteristics that made the market for copyrighted compositions more
efficient.41 The blanket licenses, therefore, accompanied a legitimate inte-
gration of functions which included sales, monitoring, and enforcement.42
C. Board of Regents v. NCAA
The NCAA was organized in 1905 to regulate and supervise college ath-
letics.43 The NCAA has controlled all aspects of televised college football
36. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 683 (1978).
37. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
38. Id. at 9.
39. Blanket licenses give the licensee the right to perform any and all of the compositions
owned by the organization issuing the license. The fee for the license is the same regardless
of the number of compositions a user anticipates performing or actually performs, and is
based on a percentage of total revenues or a flat dollar amount. Blanket licenses relieve
individual composers of the impossible task of negotiating with all the hopeful users of their
copyrighted material, and more importantly, the blanket license aids in the detection of
unauthorized users. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 19-20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
n.16 (1978)).
41. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 22. Among the advantages were substantial lowering of
costs, immediate use of material without negotiation delay, flexibility in choice of material,
and easier enforcement against unauthorized users. Id. at 20-22.
42. Id. at 20.
43. An excellent review of the history and functions of the NCAA is found in the district
court opinion. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1282-87. The fundamental policy of the NCAA is to
"maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demar-
cation between college athletics and professional sports." CONSTITUTION AND INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION art. 2, § 2(a)(1983).
Board of Regents v. NCAA
since 1953.44 It first instituted controls based on the expressed concern of
its members that the unlimited telecasting of games would be detrimental
to attendance at non-televised games.45 The basic aspects of the original
controls have survived, and include restrictions on the total number of
games televised each season and the specific number of appearances any
one team can make during a season.46
The specific regulations challenged in NCAA are found in the 1982-
1985 NCAA Television Football Plan.47 Under the network contracts,
ABC Sports, Inc. (ABC) and CBS Sports, Inc. (CBS) shared exclusive
first rights to negotiate with NCAA member institutions regarding the
live broadcast of their football games. In return for these rights, ABC and
CBS each guaranteed to pay a "minimum aggregate compensation" over
the contract period. 4' This sum was to be divided among all the teams
appearing on the networks during the course of the season .4
Under the rules developed by the NCAA, CBS and ABC alternately
selected dates over which they have the first right to choose any given
game played that day. Once the network holding fi~st choice selected its
games, the other network was in the position to be the only buyer for the
remaining games played that day. Thus, the rules eliminated competitive
bidding between the networks. 0
44. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1283.
45. Id. at 1276. In response to these concerns, the NCAA appointed a Football Television
Committee to study and report on the effects of televised college football on the gate at-
tendance of college games. The Committee retained the services of the National Opinion
Research Center, whose studies supported the notion that televising games did result in
decreased live gate attendance at games not being televised. The NCAA instituted controls
based on these studies. Id.
46. Id. at 1283. The controls were voted on by the entire membership, including those
members which did not field a football team. Of the approximately 880 members, less than
500 played football, and of that 500, only 188 were Division I schools. Although the controls
obligated the networks to telecast a few Division I[ and EII games, football telecasts remain
dominated by Division I schools. New rules were adopted in 1982 to allow only those mem-
bers that sponsored a varsity football team to vote on adoption of television controls. CON-
STITUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHETIc AsSOCIATION art. 8, §
2(a)(1983).
47. See NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1150.
48. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1289-90. The minimum aggregate compensation fee was equal
to the total amount the networks paid to individual schools for the right to their particular
games. A percentage of this fee went to the NCAA to fund certain activities. A specified
amount was reserved for the teams participating in the NCAA Division H and I football
championships, which the networks were required to televise. The remainder of the fee was
divided among all the schools which appeared on the weekly college football telecasts. Id. at
1289.
49. The particular way the sum should be divided was not specified in the contract. In-
stead the NCAA made "recommendations" as to how much should be paid for each regional
and national telecast. The networks have always implemented the recommendations and
have always paid the amount recommended by the NCAA. Id.
50. Id. at 1293. The NCAA contended that the possibility of competitive bidding cured
1983]
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An important aspect of the network contracts concerns limitations
placed on the number of appearances a school can make. In an attempt to
feature as many different teams as reasonably possible, the NCAA limited
schools to six appearances every two years, with a limit of four national
appearances over the same period.51 Appearances were to be equally di-
vided between ABC and CBS.
Based on their dissatisfaction with various aspects of the NCAA regula-
tions, a number of major football conferences and independent schools,
all members of the NCAA, banded together to form the College Football
Association (CFA).52 The original purpose of the CFA was to promote the
interests of major football playing schools within the NCAA structure.53
The CFA investigated the possibility of negotiating its own agreement
with the television networks for the broadcasting rights to games involv-
ing CFA members. It developed an independent plan and received a con-
tract offer from NBC Sports, Inc. (NBC).54 In response to CFA activities,
the NCAA adopted an official interpretation of its bylaws stating that the
NCAA controlled "aJl forms of televising of the inter-collegiate football
between the networks any alleged illegality of the contracts. However, the district court
found that the networks never had the intention to engage in competitive bidding. Id. at
1292-93. One witness from ABC Sports stated that, while it was theoretically possible for
the networks to engage in a bidding war, "the system [was] not set up in that way." Id. at
1293.
A consequence of this lack of competition was that the prices paid to teams for their
television rights became uniform, regardless of the dynamics of the games. A clear example
occurred in the fall of 1981 when the University of Oklahoma played the University of
Southern California (USC). Both teams had prestigious football programs and were ranked
among the top five teams in the nation. ABC selected the Oklahoma-USC game as one of its
regional telecasts, along with a game between The Citadel and Appalachian State, two
schools not well-known for their football programs. Two hundred local ABC stations carried
the Oklahoma-USC game while only four stations carried the Appalachian State-Citadel
game. However, all four teams received exactly the same fee for making a regional appear-
ance. But for the NCAA contract, it is doubtful that any network would have paid the same
amount for an Appalachian State-Citadel game as it would for an Oklahoma-USC game
which carried much more national interest and importance.
51. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1150. Each network was required to broadcast a minimum of 35
games per season. Within the 70 games broadcast over a two year period, at least 82 differ-
ent teams must be featured by each network. Id.
52. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1285. Membership in the CFA included five prominent ath-
letic conferences-the Big 8, Southeastern, Southwestern, Atlantic Coast, and Western Ath-
letic Conferences-and several major independent football powers such as Notre Dame,
Penn State, Pittsburgh, and the service academies. These schools are the powerhouses that
dominate college football television and would benefit most from having independent televi-
sion negotiating rights. The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both
members of the CFA.
53. Id.
54. Id. At that time only ABC and CBS were allowed to negotiate with schools under the
NCAA plan. The NBC contract was far more lucrative to CFA members than was the
NCAA contract. It allowed each team more appearances per season and resulted in larger
television income per school. Id.
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games of member institutions." 5 Despite the action, the CFA completed
negotiations with NBC for the television rights to games of CFA mem-
bers. NCAA officials then made public statements suggesting that a CFA-
NBC contract would be a violation of NCAA rules and would result in
disciplinary sanctions against all CFA members.8 6 These circumstances
led the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia to initiate
a lawsuit to block the NCAA's interference with the ability of individual
colleges to control the television rights to their football games.
H. ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH CIRcuIT'S DECISION
A. The Court's Conclusions Under the Per Se Rule
Vital to the court's decision that the NCAA regulations constituted
price-fixing which was illegal per se was the determination that the regu-
lations were naked, and not ancillary, restraints. To the extent that the
regulations were naked attempts to restrict output and manipulate price,
they were illegal per se under Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soci-
ety.57 However, had the restraints been ancillary to a cooperative produc-
tive activity, they would have been extracted from the per se category,
and subjected instead to the tests of the rule of reason.58
The NCAA argued that, as an integration of the rulemaking and rule-
enforcing activities of its members, it is a cooperative activity whose pur-
pose is to protect the amateur nature of college sports through regulation
and supervision. 59 The television plan and network contracts were ancil-
lary to this cooperative activity because they promoted its efficiency and
had procompetitive, rather than anticompetitive, effects.8 0 Therefore, the
NCAA contended that the regulations should have been scrutinized under
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,61 which
calls for analysis under the rule of reason.
62
Before analyzing the NCAA television plan, the court commented on
the scope of its examination. In reference to restraints accompanying in-
tegrations, the court held that under Broadcast Music, the inquiry should
be limited to "whether the practice facially appears to ... restrict com-
55. CONSTITUION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIA-
TION, Official Interpretation of art. 11, § 3(a)(Apr. 18, 1981). This interpretation was the first
clear statement by the NCAA that it had the right to act as the sole agent for member
institutions in negotiating football television rights, contracts, or fees.
56. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1286.
57. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
58. See R. BORK, supra note 34, at 263-70.
59. Brief for the Appellant at 17, Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 20-28.
61. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
62. Id. at 19-20.
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petition and decrease output . ,s"6S Therefore, the court would not en-
gage in a rule of reason analysis unless an examination of the face of the
regulations showed that they were not illegal per se.
In deciding that the NCAA regulations were not ancillary restraints,
the court examined three arguments. First, the court analyzed the con-
tention that the regulations promoted competition by protecting live at-
tendance at games. The NCAA argued that the detrimental economic ef-
fect that televised football had on live attendance was lessened by the
regulations, and this in turn, increased competition. 4 The court found
that, for the regulations to be procompetitive, they must increase total
viewership-both live and televised-instead of increasing only live
viewership. 5 If total viewership was not increased, live attendance was
promoted at the expense of televised viewerership. The court determined
that this argument failed to qualify the restraint as ancillary.68
Second, the court addressed the NCAA's claim that the regulation pro-
moted athletically balanced competition.17 The court dispensed with this
claim for two reasons. Although facially this appeared to be a
noneconomic justification for restricting competition, noneconomic justifi-
cations, however worthy, cannot be used to justify restraints that ad-
versely affect competition. 8 The court stated that if restraints are neces-
sary to promote athletic balance, then the NCAA is contending that open
competition would destroy athletic balance. This contention fails because
"[t]he Sherman Act will not countenance an argument that the nature of
a product or an industry structure is such that something other than
competition is desirable." 69 The court also added that less restrictive
63. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1152 (emphasis added) (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-
20).
64. Brief for the Appellant at 21, NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983). The NCAA
argued that live attendance at football games is the "lifeblood" of most schools which rely
on football box office receipts and concession revenues for support of all their athletic pro-
grams. The diversion of audiences to television may undermine college sports at these
schools, reducing the effectiveness of competition in general. Id.
65. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154.
66. Id. The court found the plan to be competitively neutral at best because it created
inefficiencies such as the "reduced output of desired products and the increased consump-
tion of less desirable products." Id. This analysis assumes that more viewing (consumption)
of televised football games is actually desired.
67. The logic behind this contention is that the more television exposure a school re-
ceives, the better known and more appealing it becomes. Exposure makes a school more
attractive to prospective student athletes and generates more money enabling schools to
increase the size of their football programs. An imbalance of exposures enables some schools
to become better at the expense of others. Brief for the Appellant at 26, NCAA, 707 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
68. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96
(1978).
69. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154 (quoting Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689).
194 [Vol. 18:185
1983] Board of Regents v. NCAA
means could be used to achieve athletic balance.70
The final argument the court considered was that the regulations were
ancillary to an integrated marketing arrangement. The NCAA stated that
college football needed to be promoted as a television series, similar to
"Dallas" or "M**S*H*", to successfully penetrate the network program-
ming market and compete with other television programming.71 In other
words, by promoting college football as a series, competition between
football games (intrabrand competition) was reduced, while competition
between football and other entertainment programming (interbrand com-
petition) was stimulated.7 2 The court acknowledged that the stimulation
of interbrand competition at the expense of intrabrand competition was
potentially procompetitive. "5 However, the court did not validate this ar-
gument because an analysis of the nature of the television market would
be necessary to see if the promotion of college football as a series actually
stimulated interbrand competition .7  The court declined to engage in
such an analysis because it went beyond an assessment of facial validity,
into the complexity of a rule of reason analysis.7 5 In the absence of such
an analysis, the court concluded that the regulations were "so fraught
with anticompetitive potential that [they] must be considered invalid per
se.
, ,7
s
70. 707 F.2d at 1154. The court did not say what these less restrictive means were, noting
only that the district court found that such means existed. The district court never specified
what the less restrictive means were. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1309-11.
71. Brief for the Appellant at 28-29, NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983). The NCAA
argued that viewers and advertisers develop loyalties to shows due to the efforts of networks
to promote those shows. If NBC, ABC, and CBS bid week by week for episodes of "Dy-
nasty", no one network would have an incentive to promote the show or to assure continuity
and quality of its episodes, because part or all of the gain would go to another network. This
would be true for college football also; thus, the NCAA argued that it must limit the number
of broadcasts of NCAA football to allow the effective promotion of college games against
other television programming. Id.
72. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1155.
73. Id. See also, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977).
74. Continental, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
75. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19 n.33.
76. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1155. The court highlighted these anticompetitive risks by com-
paring the television plan with the integration in Broadcast Music. In Broadcast Music, the
copyright holders retained the right to negotiate individual contracts and could sell outside
the blanket licensing arrangement. This ensured the presence of potential competition to
inhibit the exercise of total market power by the copyright societies. However, the court in
the instant case found no indication of potential competition because the television regula-
tions bound the individual schools to sell their broadcast rights through the NCAA televi-
sion plan only. The television plan also created foreclosure of competition by restricting the
total number of games to be broadcast, thus limiting the amount of product available to
buyers. In Broadcast Music, however, no foreclosure risks were involved since an unlimited
number of blanket licenses were offered for sale. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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B. Examination of the Court's Reasoning Under the Per Se Rule
The underlying reasons for the court's invalidation of the NCAA televi-
sion regulations demonstrate a strict adherence to the language of a con-
sistent line of Supreme Court cases concerning price-fixing. Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society 7 represents the culmination of those
cases and the NCAA decision echoes many of the principles affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Maricopa County.
In Maricopa County, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of Broad-
cast Music that the analysis of restraints accompanying integrations calls
only for facial examination. 8 Staunchly supporting this theory that the
true per se rule finds illegality solely on the face of an agreement,1 the
NCAA court refused to engage in any analysis beyond a superficial in-
quiry. Thus, the court declined to consider the argument that the televi-
sion regulations stimulated interbrand competition, even though the
court recognized that the stimulation of interbrand competition at the
expense of intrabrand competition was potentially procompetitive 0 Sim-
ilarly, the court rejected the contention that competition was enhanced
by the promotion of live gate attendance, and instead, substituted its be-
lief that total viewership must be promoted for the regulations to be
procompetitive.18
The Maricopa County opinion was influential in the court's decision to
invalidate the regulations based purely on a facial examination and to
refute the NCAA's strongest argument-the promotion of athletically
balanced competition.8 The court's decision was devoid of analysis on
this point. The court rejected the argument on its face because it ap-
peared to be a noneconomic justification and it "shaded" into the argu-
ment that competition was actually harmful to the market. ""
The per se analysis by the Tenth Circuit appears to be in harmony with
Maricopa County, yet the decision is disturbing because it seems shallow
77. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
78. Id. at 344 n.16. The Maricopa County Court supported application of the per se rule
even to the extent that it invalidated practices that would have been decided differently
under the rule of reason. So even though cases arise that do not fit the per se category
generally, such cases are not deemed "sufficiently common or important to justify the time
and expense necessary to identify them." Id.
79. See R. BORK, supra note 34, at 267.
80. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1155. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
81. 707 F.2d at 1155. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. See also Maricopa
County, 457 U.S. at 345 (The Court stated "no showing of so-called competitive abuses or
evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a
defense.") (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)).
82. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351-54.
83. See Brief for the Appellant at 26, NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
84. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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and incomplete. In its determination to engage only in facial examination,
the court left behind unanswered questions-questions that may have
been a step removed from the facial category but even further removed
from the rule of reason category.
Although the court referred to the NC4A as the "guardian of amateur-
ism",8 5 the court's decision never addressed the public service aspect of
the purpose and goals of the NCAA. The non-profit NCAA poses a situa-
tion different from the profit-oriented business enterprises that are usu-
ally associated with price-fixing violations.8 6 Non-television regulations by
the NCAA have been upheld as being "endowed with certain benefits to
society" and for "curtailing. . .potentially monopolistic practices by the
more powerful . . . . , In referring to the nature of a particular profes-
sion, the Supreme Court has stated that "the public service aspect, and
other features of [a profession], may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in an-
other context, be treated differently."8 But in NCAA the court seemed to
focus on the "pot of gold"89 potential behind restraint-free televised foot-
ball, and ignored the NCAA's articulated purpose for the restraints.
Viewed in a light more favorable to the NCAA, some of the doubtful as-
pects of the plan, such as the potentially procompetitive stimulation of
interbrand competition, look more attractive.
Although the language of most Supreme Court price-fixing decisions
speaks in broad terms, the Court does not appear to be as eager as the
Tenth Circuit to apply the per se label. A survey of many Supreme Court
price-fixing cases reveals the tendency of the Court to take a more dis-
cerning approach toward pure facial analysis. 90 The Court consistently
tends to equivocate on the per se rule and allow greater insight into the
purposes and potential values of the restraints it scrutinizes. If the Su-
preme Court zealously follows its own language, then the NCAA televi-
85. 707 F.2d at 1153.
86. Id. at 1167 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (indicating that the per se rule has been applied
only in cases involving true competitive business enterprises with purely profit-oriented
goals).
87. Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977).
See also Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 499 F.
Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (sustaining the 1978-81 NCAA television plan and network
contract).
88. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975). See also Maricopa
County, 457 U.S. at 341 (indicating that price-fixing agreements premised on public service
or ethical norms could justify a different form of analysis).
89. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1165 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano v.
Targer Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978). See generally R. BORK, supra note 34 (suggesting conflict between language of Su-
preme Court and actual application of per se rules).
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sion plan and network contracts will be held to be per se violations. How-
ever, if the Court gives some weight to the socially-beneficial purposes of
the NCAA, the regulations may be regarded in a light different from that
usually given profit-oriented business organizations, and the rule of rea-
son test will be invoked.
C. The Court's Conclusions Under the Rule of Reason
Anticipating a possible review by the Supreme Court, the NCAA court
scrutinized the television plan and network contracts under the rule of
reason. Applying the test of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States,91 the court found the regulations to be unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions.
The court found that the NCAA regulations increased the potential for
foreclosure of competition by limiting the number of buyers and sellers in
the marketplace.2 Since schools were allowed to sell their broadcast
rights only according to the provisions of the television plan, the NCAA
was found to be the only vendor of college football broadcast rights. 3 The
number of actual buyers was restricted by the exclusivity of the plan, and
the number of possible buyers was also limited because the broadcast
rights were sold only as a package.9 4 If a broadcaster did not want or was
unable to purchase an entire package of games, it was effectively elimi-
nated from the bidding.
The court then concluded that, in order to fully gauge the regulations'
net effect on competition, an assessment of market power was necessary.9
Market power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition,""9
and it can occur when there is a marketable product for which no readily
available substitute exists.97 The court agreed with the district court's
91. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Standard Oil test prohibits contracts that are "unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions." Id. at 58. The Court has held under the Standard Oil
test that "[u]nreasonableness ... could be based either (1) on the nature or character of
the contacts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presump-
tion that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices." National Soc'y of Pro-
fessional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690. See also supra note 9.
92. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1157.
93. Id.
94. Id. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
95. 707 F.2d at 1158. Market power has traditionally been one of the factors examined
under the rule of reason. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv.
L. Rav. 937 (1981).
96. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
97. Id. at 404. Whether a readily available substitute exists is determined by two factors:
(a) The reasonable interchangeability of use to which two or more products can be
put. This factor, in turn, is satisfied when two or more products (i) have essentially
similar physical characteristics, or (ii) can be put to use for the same purpose.
(b) The cross-elasticity of demand, i.e., the extent to which consumer preference
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conclusion that NCAA football constituted a unique type of Saturday af-
ternoon programming for which no readily available substitute existed.9 s
The court held that the NCAA controlled virtually one hundred percent
of the relevant market, defined as televised college football.99 The NCAA
had argued that the relevant market should be all television program-
ming, or at least all fall sports programming, thirteen percent of which
was NCAA football. 10 0 The court rejected this argument and broadly
stated that "[e]ven assuming that the market definition is too narrow, the
NCAA's total control over televised intercollegiate football, when com-
bined with NCAA football's apparent uniqueness from the perspective of
broadcasters, supports the inference that the NCAA possesses some de-
gree of market power."''1 1
The court rejected the contention that the restraints promoted athleti-
cally balanced competition by reasserting that less restrictive means ex-
isted.'02 A properly drawn system of passover payments was suggested as
one way that the disparity in television revenues between schools could
be reduced to ensure adequate athletic funding for all schools. 10 3 The
court further noted that without the imposition of the NCAA's television
regulations, the networks would show more games on a local level. This
would allow more schools the opportunity to have their games televised
and would have the effect of equalizing revenues. 0 4
The NCAA's contention that the regulations were vital to the penetra-
tion of college football into the network programming market was essen-
tially destroyed by the earlier finding that NCAA football was a unique
form of programming. Since no readily available substitutes existed for
NCAA football, there was no television programming to compete against
shifts freely between two or more products.
2 J. VoN KALINOwSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 6G.04(1) (1982).
98. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1158. Several factors that support this conclusion were mentioned
by the court. First, NCAA football dominates the audience share of Saturday afternoon
programming. The cost per viewer for advertising time during NCAA telecasts is more than
2 /2 times greater than the average cost per viewer for other programming. NCAA football
has never been seriously challenged by programming in opposing network time slots-old
movies, cartoons, and comedies are usually shown. Professional football, the most logical
substitute, is precluded by its own antitrust exemption from being broadcast on Saturday
afternoons during the NCAA football season. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1293, 1294 (1982). Fi-
nally, the demographic makeup of viewers of NCAA football in unique in that it consists
mostly of persons in middle to upper income brackets and college graduates. These findings
were based on the evidence in the district court record. 546 F. Supp. at 1319-23.
99. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1319-23.
100. Brief for the Appellant at 40, NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
101. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1159.
102. Id.
103. Id. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-71 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (suggesting that a distributor who raids or sells across territorial bound-
aries may be obligated to share the profit with the dealer whose territory is invaded).
104. 707 F.2d at 1159-60.
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it and no interbrand competition existed. The lack of interbrand competi-
tion, combined with the television plan's removal of intrabrand competi-
tion, eliminated price competition from the market.'0 5
Finally, the court suggested that the NCAA had used its dominance
over all college sports regulation to obtain control of the broadcast rights
to college football. 10 6 The NCAA had used sanctions to force schools to
submit to the television regulations. These activities affected the bigger
schools, such as CFA members, almost exclusively since they were the
schools whose games had the most commercial value.10 7
D. Examination of the Court's Reasoning Under the Rule of Reason
The court's scope of inquiry under the rule of reason was limited to an
examination of the commercial effects of the NCAA's television regula-
tions. No attempt was made by the court to analyze the restraints in light
of the NCAA's traditional regulatory functions. The court appeared to
agree with the appellees' contention that when the NCAA enters into the
market place and involves itself in commerce, it must follow the same
rules as traditional business and commercial entities.'08
The court's initial conclusion that the NCAA regulations increased con-
centration in the marketplace appears to be somewhat conjectural. The
court does not explain how the exclusive network contracts differ from
any other long-term commitment contracts.'0 9 The court also fails to
mention that in many commercial transactions potential buyers are fore-
closed from sales opportunities because they are financially unable to bid
on a certain product. Essentially, the court states that while there is
nothing wrong with an individual university entering into a long-term ex-
clusive contract, anticompetitive risks are created when the NCAA enters
into such a contract on behalf of that university. It is the NCAA's regula-
tion, not the type of contract executed, that is unreasonable.
The court's conclusion that NCAA football constitutes a unique type of
Saturday afternoon programming appears to be better substantiated. The
district court record contained enough evidence to reasonably support a
conclusion that from the standpoint of the networks, which must face the
problem of finding satisfactory programming for Saturday afternoon, no
readily available substitute for NCAA football exists. 10 Thus, the NCAA
could dictate the conditions under which the networks may televise col-
105. Id. at 1160.
106. Id.
107. Id. See supra note 52.
108. Brief for the Appellees at 35, NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
109. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1979); Fleer Corp. v.
Tops Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981).
110. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1297-1301.
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lege football.
In response to the contention that the NCAA television plan promotes
athletically balanced competition, the court again asserted that less re-
strictive means existed.111 The court's suggested alternative of the passo-
ver payment plan 1 2 does not seem reasonable since the goal of the CFA
members was to free themselves of any restraints affecting the sale of
their broadcast rights. Although such a system could equalize revenues, it
would not be acceptable to those bigger schools which were actually
bringing in the revenues. The controlling factor in the court's rule of rea-
son analysis was its definition of the relevant market and the subsequent
determination that market power existed. The existence of market power
was essential to finding that the NCAA regulations presented marketwide
anti-competitive risks. When the market was narrowly defined as tele-
vised college football rather than all sports programming in the fall, the
court could infer that the NCAA controlled virtually one hundred percent
of the relevant market.1 3 None of the commercial justifications of the
NCAA would be sufficient against this conclusion." 4
The district court was justified in its finding that the NCAA television
plan is unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions. The conclu-
sions of product uniqueness and market power are dispositive of the case.
However, the court neglected to examine the intent and purposes behind
the regulations. The Supreme Court has given some recognition to the
public service and socially redeeming aspects of an enterprise." 5 Should
the Supreme Court examine the commercial effects of the regulations in
light of the NCAA's noncommercial purposes and goals, the restraints
might be found to be legal ancillary restraints. Nonetheless, the determi-
nation of market power appears to be the controlling factor under the
rule of reason. Therefore, despite an inquiry into purpose and intent, if
the Supreme Court finds that the NCAA possesses some reasonable de-
gree of market power, the television plan and network contracts will be
deemed to constitute price-fixing and will be illegal per se.
III. CONCLUSION
NCAA deals with an important aspect of antitrust law-the proper ap-
plication of the per se rule to price-fixing agreements. This case illus-
trates a classic example of balancing judicial convenience against discern-
111. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1159.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See R. BORK, supra note 34, at 279 (suggesting that a restraint will only be legal if
the market share of the party involved does not amount to market power). See also L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 17.
115. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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ing examination. The NCAA court attempts to adhere to the language of
a recent line of Supreme Court cases dealing with price-fixing and the
application of the per se rule. However, in its quest for a purely facial
examination of the NCAA television regulations, the court has left the
decision open to question.
The Supreme Court decision probably will analyze the NCAA regula-
tions under the rule of reason, and give more deference to the socially
beneficial aspects of the regulations. However, under the rule of reason,
the validity of the regulations will ultimately be determined by the test of
market power. If the Supreme Court concludes that the NCAA possesses
a substantial degree of market power, the television regulations will be
held to be unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.
Robert M. Pfeifer
ADDENDUM
On June 27, 1984, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of University
of Oklahoma." The Court relied on a "rule of reason" analysis in affirming
the judgment of the court of appeals.
1. No. 83-271 (June 27, 1984).
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